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ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 15.03.04 03:34. Заголовок: Паника, как одна из причин поражений в РЯВ - часть 5


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ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 15.03.04 04:54. Заголовок:


Предварительные данные о распределении по годам призыва 224 нижних чинов БКр «Владимир Мономах» в ходе Цусимского похода (Случайная выборка):
До 1900 года\ 27%
1900 \ 14%
1901 \ 21%
1902 \ 3%
1903 \ 24%
1904 \ 12% На материалах дела № 5763 (Часть1) оп.4 ф417 РГА ВМФ


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ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 15.03.04 09:39. Заголовок:


Всем доброго времени суток.
Для начала, г. Тулеген конечно имеет право отвечать кому и когда ему удобно, мне же подождать, естественно, не проблема.
Во-вторых, на удочку г. Тулегена я конечно не поддамся и в легалистический спор не влезу. Да, оснований утверждать о наличии паники в отряде Насибы, вроде и нет (но об этом ниже); с другой стороны, ни один суд не сможет постановить, что на русской эскадре 31 Марта наличествовала паника, т.к. оба «очевидца» имеют мотивы для создания ложного впечатления, а независимые наблюдатели (в том числе родные американцы) паники в упор не видели.
Теперь о главном. К сожалению, при переводе отрывка Корбетта о гибели «Петропавловска», я допустил ряд неточностей (по причине позднего времени). Т.к. г. Тулеген продолжает этот отрывок цитировать, я его привожу здесь в оригинале (скан+OCR).
But Admiral Makarov was not to be caught so easily. So soon as he realised that he was in the presence of the enemy’s battle squadron he gave up the chase and turned back. With only two battleships and four cruisers he was no match for the six battleships and four armoured cruisers which his adversary now had under his hand, besides Admiral Dewa’s unarmoured division. Still, as before, he was not to be driven into the harbour. All his battleships were now out of the gullet except the Sevastopol and his intention was to accept battle under the protection of the batteries. When two miles from shore he therefore turned to the cast and began to form his line. When it was complete and the Sevastopol had taken her station he increased speed on a course N. 22 E.(1) On grasping the Russian intention Admiral Togo ordered Admiral Kamimura to turn back and keep out of sight while he stood off to watch what was going to happen.
In the Japanese fleet it must have been a time of breathless excitement that is difficult to exaggerate. To all appearance the Russians were moving in a figure of eight precisely in the area which had been mined and yet they moved scatheless. Everyone in the Port Arthur Squadron, we are told, had in fact forgotten the incident of the previous night, and the resolution to search the area where the mysterious craft had appeared. The Easter festivities had only just concluded. The Admiral had been up all night, his destroyer Captains had blundered as badly as ever, and the occurrences of the morning had been of a character to overthrow his wonted care in sweeping before he came out.(2)
The suspense did not last long. A few minutes after the order to keep out of sight had gone to Admiral Kamimura the Russian flagship had arrived abreast of the Lutin Rock. There as usual Admiral Makarov began to make his turn back to the south westward. Scarcely was the helm put over when a terrible explosion, followed immediately by two others enveloped the flagship in a cloud of steam and smoke. Out of it her mizzen mast, funnel, turret and bridge were flung into the air; her screw rose high from the water in a sheet of flame and in another minute she was gone. «The sight,» say the Japanese, as though horrified with the completeness of

footnotes to page 182
(1) Morskoi Sbornik, September, 1912.
(2) «This day,» says a Russian Officer, «in the hurry to go to the assistance of the Strashni, which had lost company with her consorts . . . . he had flown into a frenzy of anger and neglected to take his usual precautions. » - Japanese Published History, I, p. 123 (Russian note).

their success, » was a most appalling one.» But it was not the end.
The way the Russians faced the catastrophe was beyond raise. Some men, they say, fainted, and many fell to their knees in prayer, but there was no noise or confusion.(1) The men for the most part went mechanically to quarters, boats ere lowered for rescue work, and Prince Ukhtomski, second in command, quietly took charge. Proceeding to the head of the line he signalled the fleet to follow him on the course the dead Admiral had been about to take. So he led them back across the entrance towards White Wolf Hill, where lay the other mine field. Still he turned in safety, but no sooner had he completed his 16 points than another loud explosion told at his second astern, the Pobyeda, had been struck. She did not sink, but it was more than the hardest nerves could endure. A wild panic ensued. Ships turned this way and that in complete confusion, threatening every moment to ram one another; there was a cry of submarines, the gun crews began firing at random into the water and the shore batteries followed suit. The danger and confusion were now redoubled. Shell splinters were flying everywhere; order after order to cease fire had no effect; nor was it till the officers by main force re the men from their guns that they recovered their senses. Then at last Prince Ukhtomski was able to lead them in - the Pobyeda staggering ahead with a heavy list.
For some reason that is not explained nothing was done by the Japanese to interfere with the retirement. To the Russians themselves it seemed that in that time of frenzy even the most distant shell fire would have had an incalculable effect. But not a shot was fired. Apparently the Japanese were too far away to know what was happening. A slight clearing of the mist had enabled them to make out the Russian Fleet just before the catastrophe, but all they had seen of it was a column of smoke which again drew a veil over the scene. They could tell one ship had gone down but that was all. They did not know which it was, nor was it till some time later that a cruiser sent in to reconnoitre reported the panic firing. This may account for Admiral Togo’s inaction. It was only half past ten when the Russian flagship went down. There was still plenty of time to engage, but the Admiral contented himself with parading to and fro before the port, till the last Russian ship was seen to enter the harbour. Then he withdrew out of torpedo danger for the assigned randezvous south of Thornton Haven.

footnote to page 183
(1) Japanese Published History, I, page 123 (Russian note).

Хочу обратить внимание Общества на сноски 2 и 3. Japanese Published History это всего-навсего русский «Мейдзи» (других просто нет), а Russian note это примечания русского издателя (ГМШ), причём сноска 2 выглядит точь-в-точь как Семёновский текст. Секретные японские источники у Корбетта проходят как Japanese Confidential History. Также было бы неплохо обратить внимание на слова: «The way the Russians faced the catastrophe was beyond raise. Some men, they say, fainted, and many fell to their knees in prayer, but there was no noise or confusion.» Это явная дань «дем-официозу» Семёнова, к тому же со словами «по слухам» или «поговаривают». Доказательство, ИМХО, не серьёзное. С каких пор молитва служит признаком паники? За упокой души погибших, да и всех остальных -- понимали же, что война проиграна.


А вот кстати и описание гибели двух «японцев» из того-же источника.
Terrible as was the disaster it was trivial to what followed it in a few hours. In the fog, which had prevented Admiral Dewa approaching the Port Arthur coast as closely as usual, the Russians had been taking a measure unprecedented in war. For some time past the idea of laying mine fields out


in the open sea upon the Japanese line of communication, had been mooted. Admiral Stark had refused to listen to so ruthless a scheme, and for a while Admiral Vitgeft had also resisted it. But as the strain grew greater he gave way. The Captain of the mining vessel Amur had noted how regular was the parade of the Japanese blockading squadrons and he begged to be allowed to lay a mine field in their usual track. At length it was conceded he might try at the first convenient opportunity, and it was on the 14th the weather gave him the chance he wanted. The fog was low so that while he could see the Japanese masts he himself was invisible. He was able, therefore, to slip out under escort of the Novik unobserved. Commencing 10 miles S. by E. from the entrance of Port Arthur he laid a line of mines from 50 to 100 feet apart, which stretched for a mile across the Japanese track.
In the evening of the same day, without any suspicion of so revolutionary a device, Admiral Nashiba put to sea according to programme to relieve Admiral Dewa. He had with him three battleships Hatsuse (flag), Shikishima, and Yashima, with the cruiser Kasagi and his despatch vessel Tatsuta. Early in the morning he sent the Kasagi ahead to look into the entrance, and at 6.45, having reached Encounter Rock, he stood in himself N.W. till he reached a point 15 miles S.E. 1/2 E. of the entrance. In the offing was the Takasago in charge of the cable ship; and not far away was Rear Admiral Togo’s squadron, which had left Yentoa Bay at 5.0 that morning on its way to make its demonstration at Kaiping. Here also the Kasagi came in to report all quiet, and, sending her back to watch inshore, the Admiral proceeded to patrol to the E. by N. across the mouth of the port. The usual patrolling course was somewhat further to the south, but he says he took the line he did owing to the report that there was no sign of the enemy. As it happened it was a course which brought him straight in the midst of the mine field, and at 10.50 about ten miles S.E. of Liau ti shan, the Hatsuse fouled a mine. There was a loud explosion and she began to heel over with her steering engine compartment flooded and her port main engine useless. The Admiral at once signalled eight points to starboard together, but in vain. A few minutes later the rear ship Yashima was also struck. Two explosions were heard, but she too kept afloat. The whole thing was inexplicable. The Admiral signalled «Look out for submarines,» and the Shikishima


began firing into the water. The Admiral, less disturbed, called up the Takasago, which was still in sight, to leave the cable ship and go to the Yashima’s assistance, and sent away his despatch vessel to call back the Kasagi to take his own ship in tow. By 11.30 when she was alongside, the Hatsuse’s stern walk was under water, and she was heeling four degrees. Still a hawser was passed and the Kasagi was just hauling in when the helpless flagship struck another mine which shattered her main magazine. A deafening explosion was, followed by a burst of yellow smoke. Both her funnels fell: her main mast broke off: her upper deck flew into the air, and in a minute and a half she had gone down with her ram high out of water. So sudden and complete was the catastrophe that the loss of life was appalling. The Tatsuta and Kasagi managed to save the Admiral and Captain with 21 other officers and 313 men. The rest went down with the ship, to the number of 38 officers and 458 men.
As for the Yashima she was still afloat. By the use of a collision mat and desperate exertion at the pumps Captain Sakamoto was able at half past twelve to move her slowly off under her own steam towards Encounter Rock. His one idea was that if she must sink it should be out of the enemy’s sight.
The catastrophe itself had taken place in full view of the Russian observation station. They had seen the Hatsuse go down. They could see the Yashima staggering off.

Особенно же меня заинтриговал вот этот пассаж: «The Admiral signalled «Look out for submarines,» and the Shikishima began firing into the water. The Admiral, less disturbed, called up the Takasago,...»
Выходит, адмирал только приказал «следить за морем, возможны субмарины», а приказа открыть огонь не отдавал. Кто же его отдал? Командир ЭБра, офицеры, или комендоры стрельнули без команды? Это неизвестно, но в следующем же предложении говорится что адмирал был «less disturbed». Чем кто? А ведь «disturbed» это «обеспокоен, взволнован, расстроен» (специально смотрел в словарь -- не доверился себе от неожиданности). Так что, получается было нечто наподобие паники? Может быть. В американском суде такое обвинение ессно не пройдёт (да и в любом другом, даже Басманном, тоже), но здесь слава богу не американский суд а русский форум, со всеми вытекающими...

Напоследок, я не требую от г. Тулегена немедленного ответа, время терпит.

P.S. г. Тулеген, показания мичмана В.П.Шмитта лежат здесь:
www.tsusima.narod.ru/web/...jw_isl_shmitt_makarov.htm
P.P.S. г. Тулеген, не знаю какого доктора Вы имеете в виду, лично я говорил о докторе Кравченко, и его книге «Через три океана». Это об «Авроре» и, соответственно, Цусиме.

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ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 15.03.04 17:58. Заголовок:


Кстяти, тут шёл разговор о НВП в японских школах и о нужности и ненужности образования для пехоты. Соотвесвенно, вопрос, а какое влияние оказывает НВП (где максимум учат разбирать винтовку) на боеспособность экипажей кораблей?

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ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 15.03.04 18:23. Заголовок:


Для Олег: Олег, добрый день. Естественно не оказывает, да собственно и НВП то в нашем понимании слова небыло, это я очень очень условно написал... Имел я ввиду не столько умнеие разбирать винтовку(в школах первой ступени этого не преподовали, программы там не сильно отличались от таковых в Русских школах) сколько воспитание чувства патриатизма. С уважением Александр

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ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 15.03.04 19:26. Заголовок:


Для РЫБА: Добрый день, Александр. Вы знаете, по моему личному опыту НВП сейчас ну никак не влияет на патриотизм, хотя может быть тогда, когда не было кино и книги почти не читали его роль была больше. Но всё равно, я бы не стал преувеличивать роль этого предмета, ИМХО он оказывает не большее влияние, чем закон божий на веру человека (тут скорее важен не школьный предмет, а в какой среде и семье человек воспитывается и общается).

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ссылка на сообщение  Отправлено: 10.12.04 07:13. Заголовок:


Для предотвращения группового возбуждения с дезорганизацией целенаправленной деятельности, т.е. паники имеются рабочие методики повышения устойчивости к стрессорным влияниям экстремального характера. Грубо -они основаны на великом учении Павлова и Селье. Основа - выработка рабочего рефлекса и стандартизация изменений обстановки, т.е. тренаж. Кто лучше обучен, тот быстрее реагирует и скорее ликвидирует негативное состояние. Имеется масса учебников психологии и практик, и в И-нете.

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